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Abstract: It is argued here that an economics centred on subjective utility-
maximization is unsuitable for the analysis and policy grounding of health care
provision. To some extent, the peculiarities of health care have been recognized
by mainstream health economists, who sometimes abandon Paretian welfare
considerations to focus on needs instead. This article examines important
peculiarities of health care that are relatively neglected in the literature. Some of
these concern health care needs: while health itself is a universal need, needs for
health care provision are largely involuntary, varied, and idiosyncratic. These
issues have important consequences for the planning of health care systems and
the extent of transaction costs in any market-based system. These factors,
combined with the inherent dynamism of modern health care needs and
capabilities, create an opening for alternative approaches to health care
economics.
Sadly, economics today is a relatively monolithic discipline. It is typically
defined in terms of one set of assumptions and approaches, rather than in terms
of an object of analysis – the economy, which could in principle be analysed
from different perspectives. Taking inspiration from some alternative traditions
in economics, this essay questions the adequacy of orthodox analyses of health
care systems and points to a different approach.
Health care provision and expenditure are attracting increasing attention
from economists, but alternative approaches within economics have received
relatively little consideration.1 Neoclassical theoretical concepts remain at the
forefront, despite the claim that they have been transcended elsewhere
(Colander, 2005). It is argued here that the peculiar features of the health sector
and the special requirements of health policy limit the viability of a neoclassical
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approach even more severely than in other typical areas of its application. As
Mark Blaug (1998: S65) put it: ‘Health economics would seem to be a perfect
topic for heterodox dissent . . . health economics is a field which must make
the average neoclassical economist squirm because it challenges his or her
standard assumptions at every turn.’
Neoclassical economic theory assumes rational, utility-maximizing behaviour
by agents with given preference functions. It focuses on equilibrium states and is
marked by an absence of chronic information problems beyond a probability
calculus. Instead of focusing on the economy as an object of analysis, neo-
classical economics defines itself as the general ‘science of choice’ assuming
rational agents. It is sometimes upheld that these neoclassical precepts define
economics, and to abandon them is to abandon economics itself. This narrow
view of economics is relatively recent. By contrast Alfred Marshall (1920: 1)
defined economics not in terms of specific assumptions but as ‘the study of
mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part of individual
and social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and
with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing’.
The standard normative neoclassical approach to economic welfare assumes
that individuals seek to maximize their utility; the individual is the best judge of
whether his or her utility is maximized. Changes are acceptable only if they
increase the utility of at least one person and decrease the utility of no-one. The
latter is of course the Pareto criterion. But these welfare criteria are so unsuited
for health policy that many mainstream health economists are inclined to adopt
alternative normative criteria, focusing on measures of health rather than utility
(Culyer, 1991; Hurley, 2000). One is left wondering why neoclassical theoretical
propositions are retained, when the standard normative apparatus of neoclassical
theory is often abandoned. The adoption of some but not other elements in the
standard neoclassical package is a bit odd. This essay questions the relevance of
all the defining neoclassical precepts in this context.
Leading mainstream health economists suggest that health care has special
features that make it different from other domains of application, posing
restrictions on the appropriateness of some neoclassical assumptions. Why is
health care different? In response, the literature points to the presence in health
care of externalities, information asymmetries, uncertainty, supplier-induced
demand, and derived demand (Arrow, 1963; Reinhardt, 1985; Labelle et al.,
1994; Blaug, 1998; Hurley, 2000; Rice, 2001). But while all these features are
important, they are neither universal in health care systems nor unique to
them (Hodgson, 2008). Here I try to identify the peculiarities of health care sys-
tems by building on the neglected but vital concept of need. By contrast, main-
stream economics starts from the subjective satisfaction or utility of the
individual. Modern mainstream economics rejects or ignores the concept of
need, but many leading economists from Adam Smith to Alfred Marshall have
acknowledged objective needs as well as subjective satisfactions.
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While shifting the analysis from a utility-based to a needs-based approach, it
is not naively assumed that health authorities or professionals always know
best. Indeed, the problem is one of institutional design where knowledge is
developed and distributed, and where mistakes become useful cues for learning
and adaptation. An institutionally sensitive, needs-based analysis is capable of
identifying distinctive features of health care. It also proposes a link between
the recognition of needs and personal motivation, and argues that the salience
and nature of needs in health care is an important motivational factor for health
care professionals. This implies a critique of incentive systems that rely princip-
ally on pecuniary rewards for health care workers. To simplify the argument I
concentrate on essential health care services contracted by specific individuals
and provided by trained health care professionals, including primary, hospital,
disability, and other forms of care. These aspects of health care provision take
up a large and growing part of national income in most developed countries.
Less attention is given here to the important issue of public health policy.
Health as a universal need
Health is an objective, universal need, irrespective of whether or not it is also a
want. A distinction must be made between wants and needs, where wants are
culturally conditioned subjective desires and needs are objective conditions of
autonomy, survival, well-being and social interaction (Dewey, 1939; Maslow,
1954; Boulding, 1966; Kapp, 1976; Sen, 1985; Lutz and Lux, 1988; Braybrooke,
1987; Doyal and Gough, 1991; Nussbaum and Sen, 1993; Corning, 2000).
However, for various reasons, several social scientists have become suspicious of
a separate concept of need.
Cultural relativists proclaim that apparent needs are simply reflections of a
specific culture. Social constructivists decry any objective foundation for the
need concept. Nevertheless, as Len Doyal and Ian Gough (1991) demonstrate,
when confronted with real world circumstances, these perspectives end up rely-
ing on universal or objective standards of evaluation, equivalent to needs.
Somewhat inconsistently, those that claim that the individual is always the
best judge of his or her welfare, rarely go so far as to condone entirely voluntary
versions of slavery, pornography, prostitution, incest, drug use, vote-buying, or
sex with children. But if satisfaction is everything, why should they be prohib-
ited, especially when the transaction is voluntary on both sides? Furthermore,
the establishment of human liberty and the autonomy of choice depend on the
‘need’ for information concerning the choices, some knowledgeable understand-
ing of their consequences, and sufficiently healthy and adequate physical and
mental capacities to make an evaluation (Nussbaum and Sen, 1993).
Against cultural relativists and subjectivists, Doyal and Gough (1991) and
Martha Nussbaum (2000) establish mental and physical health as a basic
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human need. Its universality is grounded on the common biological and social
characteristics shared by all humans. Factors such as clean water, shelter, physi-
cal security, and appropriate health care contribute to health needs, and their
efficacy can be examined by scientific investigation. Accordingly, most if not
all health needs are potentially distinguishable from subjective wants: the latter
may vary from individual to individual and culture to culture. Survival, health,
and autonomy are the preconditions for individual action in any culture, and
thus constitute the most basic human needs.
Definitionally, needs must be satisfied for the individual to avoid serious
physical or mental harm. Harm includes impediments to individual aspirations
or social involvement. Described in such terms, needs are objective, universal,
and trans-cultural. Of course, investigators who attempt to identify and evalu-
ate needs will be encumbered by prejudices that derive in part from their own
history and culture. But this does not mean that objective needs do not exist.
The problem is to set up scientific procedures and responsive institutions that
discern and constantly re-evaluate the nature of needs. We must distinguish
between the objective and universal need for health and the individual’s need
for health care. Unlike health needs, health care needs vary enormously among
people and through time.
By contrast, some health care demands – such as many for cosmetic surgery –
have little relation to survival. Some qualify as minor needs at most. On the
other hand, severe disfigurement can inhibit social participation and in these
cases surgery may become a significant need. As with many classifications,
the boundaries are fuzzy. But that does not mean that there is no substance to
the distinction. Especially with health care, the majority of needs are obvious
in broad terms. Broken bones require surgical treatment, infections require
medicines, sicknesses require nursing, and so on.
Some writers acknowledge objective needs in the above manner, but classify
them as such only if the means exist to ensure that they are met. Some define
health care needs as emerging ‘when an individual has an illness or disability
for which there is an effective and acceptable treatment or cure’ (Matthew,
1971: 27). This is a capacities-dependent definition of need. By contrast, in
line with Doyal and Gough (1991), needs are defined here in objective
terms that are independent of such the means to meet them. This is a capacities-
independent definition of need.
One might expect those influenced by neoclassical economics to focus largely
on wants and subjective utility, rather than objective needs. But this is not
always the case with health economists. A concept of need relating to the ability
to benefit from health care interventions, in contrast to demand (which is a
function of preferences and ability to pay) is recognized by several leading
mainstream health economists (Culyer, 1995; Hurley, 2000). Mainstream
health economists often abandon neoclassical welfare analysis, to focus instead
on more objective measures such as ‘social indicators’ or the influential ‘Quality
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Adjusted Life Years’ or ‘QALYs’ (Maynard, 1991). Essentially, these are indica-
tors of need, or of treatment priority based on need (although the methods used
to measure QALYs are preference-based).
Compare health care with some other basic needs, such as food. Dietary
needs are less complex than health care needs, and include vitamins, energy,
fibre, and key chemical elements, while limiting the intake of fats, sugars, salt
and so on. By contrast, health care needs often require expert diagnosis. Fur-
thermore, much health care requires the involvement of skilled health care pro-
fessionals. This is one of the key features that makes health care special.
The recognition that health needs are universal helps to sustain an ethos of
professional commitment and obligation by health workers. Health work is
much more than a source of remuneration. Typically, health sector workers
attempt to meet objective health care needs and deploy deep-seated motivations
to care for the welfare of others. While mainstream health economists acknow-
ledge the existence of non-pecuniary motivations in the health sector (Scott
et al., 2003), they retain utilitarian theories of motivation that fail to recognize
criticisms of this approach in the huge literature on motivation in organiza-
tional psychology and elsewhere. Not only is the intrinsic motivation of work
itself widely considered in key texts (Vroom, 1964; Deci, 1975; Steers and
Porter, 1991; Frey, 1992), but also the more intense motivational spur of health
care need is acknowledged in empirical studies of health care professions
(Janssen et al., 1999; Benson and Dundis, 2003).
In sum, the objective and universal character of health needs conflicts not
only with the utilitarian presuppositions at the core of neoclassical economics,
but also help to explain the part of the motivations and professional commit-
ments of health care workers. Consequently, a needs-based approach has
important implications both for the commissioning and provision of health
care services. Theories and policies that underestimate these factors are likely
to be at best inadequate, and at worst destructive of commitment and morale
among health workers.
Most health care needs are involuntary and unequally distributed
Like health, education is also a universal need, requiring the involvement of
skilled professionals. But for reasons given below, there is a divergence in other
respects between education and health. The need for health is universal, but the
need for health care services is unequally distributed and depends to a signifi-
cant degree on factors beyond the control of the individual. Generally you
don’t choose to be sick – with possible exceptions including illnesses related
to drugs, smoking, and alcohol and over-eating. People with inherited illnesses,
or inherited dispositions towards illness, do not choose their afflictions either.
Furthermore, a large set of needs for health care services result from accidents,
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for many of which the victim bears little or no responsibility. In short, much of
the need for health care results from a lottery of misfortune, as if God was play-
ing dice with human health.
Comparing health care with education or nutrition, some people do have spe-
cial educational or nutritional needs. But the general need for education or
nutrition is much more broadly and more uniformly distributed than the need
for health care services. Because many health care patients are innocent of the
causes of their plight, only the most hardened and insensitive of observers can
avoid reflecting: ‘It could have happened to me.’ This special feature of health
care needs has major normative and policy implications. First, the fact that
most people do not willingly cause their health problems generates widespread
sympathy among others, including health practitioners. This is another source
of the motivational ethos of professional obligation in the health sector. It is a
further reason why a needs-based approach has implications for the production
of health care services, as well as their commissioning.
Second, this special characteristic of health care needs further challenges the
typical neoclassical Pareto criterion and gives rise instead to concerns regarding
equity or universal access to health care. Mainstream economists are likewise
impelled in this direction: so equity or universal access has become a topic of
discussion in both orthodox and heterodox texts alike (Culyer and Wagstaff,
1993; Hurley, 2000; Reisman, 1993). It seems obvious that Paretian norms
are less appropriate in this context, and it would be better to turn to alternative
ethical traditions, including the intellectual lineage from Adam Smith in the
Moral Sentiments to John Rawls and beyond, where moral criteria necessarily
involve concern for others as well as oneself.
Health care needs are varied and idiosyncratic
The need for health care services is unequal in more senses than one. It is
unequal because of the random lottery of misfortune, as discussed above.
Furthermore, even when affected by a similar injury or infection, the nature
and severity of the outcome can vary from individual to individual. Health
care needs are idiosyncratic, reflecting substantial physiological and neurolo-
gical variations between individuals. Differences in health problems emanate
from differences in past environment and genetic endowment. The peculiarities
often vary significantly from person to person; each patient requires an indi-
vidual diagnosis and remedy.
By comparison, the need for educational services is also partly idiosyncratic:
a significant proportion of students have special needs. But the degree of hetero-
geneity and inequality is much less, confirmed by the fact that successful school-
ing curricula involve a great deal of material and teaching common to all
students. Everyone needs to be taught to read. But most will manage to learn
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together with others in a classroom. By contrast, even among those patients
requiring a simple or standard operation, detailed procedures will vary consid-
erably because of differences in age, weight, allergies, and so on. Drugs, physio-
therapy, and after-care will differ, because of varied needs.
Some operations – such as for cataracts – are fairly simple and standard.
Generally, however, attempts to treat all patients in exactly the same way
would be catastrophic. Even when patients with similar afflictions are brought
together to benefit from shared specialist skills and equipment (thus realizing
possible economies of scale) their detailed health care needs typically
remain highly diverse. Highly standardized mass-production of health care ser-
vices is possible in only a limited number of cases. In contrast to education,
there is very little equivalent common provision among patients undergoing
health care.
Faced with heterogeneous goods or services, economic analysis faces familiar
problems of theoretical tractability. Although there is a significant mainstream
literature on heterogeneous goods or services, much standard theory assumes
relatively few homogeneous products. However, the problem here is not simply
one of building formal models. Under conditions of limited information, the
heterogeneity of goods and services creates a set of problems of a contractual
and administrative type. Interestingly, these problems appear in both market-
based and planned economic systems. They are highly relevant in the health
care context. In a market-based system with limited information, the idiosyn-
crasy and heterogeneity of goods and services is an important source of transac-
tion costs (Williamson, 1975). These are the costs of formulating, monitoring,
and enforcing contracts. By contrast, if a set of goods and services were homo-
geneous, then one standard contract would often do, because their characteris-
tics would in all likelihood be widely known.
Since the pioneering work of Coase (1937), Williamson (1975) and other
‘new’ institutional economists, the concept of transaction costs has become
commonplace in modern economics, although it has proved difficult to incor-
porate adequately in formal models. By contrast, and with a few exceptions
(Hsiao, 1995; Ashton, 1998; Jan, 2000), little attention is paid to the concept
and its significance in mainstream health economics. In the purportedly authori-
tative Handbook of Health Economics (Culyer and Newhouse, 2000), transac-
tion costs are mentioned briefly and without much elaboration. There is no
significant discussion of transaction costs in The Elgar Companion to Health
Economics (Jones, 2006). Yet in health systems that rely more on markets,
such as the United States, it is estimated that transaction costs amount to
25% or more of health insurance premiums (Hsiao, 1995: 138). Transaction
costs impinge on both demand and supply in a system. Information and other
problems concerning the contracting of insurance affect the demand for health
care. Commercialization and competition in the production of health care ser-
vices enhance possibilities for litigation and contractual dispute. A comparison
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of different health care systems suggest that high transaction costs is one of the
typical downside problems that arise within private and market-based health
care provision.
A possible advantage of planned hierarchies is that they may reduce transac-
tion costs, just as they are sometimes reduced by organizing production under
the unitary administrative umbrella of the firm (Coase, 1937). Nevertheless,
while transaction costs may be reduced in a planned system, the planning of
heterogeneous goods or services may bring problems of a different kind. Con-
sider the formerly planned economies in the Soviet Union or China. Faced
with product heterogeneity and complexity, the central planning authorities
were nevertheless obliged to fix relatively simple quantitative targets. However,
in focusing on the targets rather than the overall quality or saleability of the
output, firms responded by producing unsuitable products. Planning targets in
the textile sector in terms of square metres led to the production of thin, fragile
cloth. Changing the target to weight led to useless, sackcloth-like material. Plan-
fulfilment targets are bound to cause such distortions when significant varia-
tions in product characteristics are typical (Nove, 1979). Nevertheless, large
corporations function as centrally directed organizations, but to some degree
they overcome these problems. They cope with dynamic change by decentraliz-
ing decision-making, simulating competition between internal divisions and
other administrative measures. Furthermore, the Soviet experience suggests
that when highly centralized hierarchies settle into established routines, they
can manage to function, albeit without much dynamism or growth. Generally,
routinized hierarchies can cope better within a steady state rather than with
processes of dynamic transformation (Nelson, 1981).
To what extent have plan-fulfilment problems appeared in centrally planned
health care systems? Such problems are more likely to emerge if, instead of
relying mostly on the judgements and habits of health care professionals and
on the routinized practices of local health care organizations, central planners
attempt to bring about radical transformations in the system. When changes
impact upon the system, routines are disrupted by turbulence and uncertainty.
Hence serious problems can arise when central health care authorities, driven
by their own strategic agenda, disrupt a system that is moving along largely
under the impetus of its local habits and routines. Arguably, such problems
have become prominent as a result of a series of radical attempts by
British governments since the 1980s to reform the National Health Service in
different ways.
In the debate among economists in the 1930s over the efficacy of centrally
planned systems, the defenders of central planning used neoclassical theoretical
tools. Critics such as Friedrich Hayek (1945) emphasized that mainstream
theory neglected the problems of information, knowledge, heterogeneity, and
radical uncertainty that are prevalent in complex economic systems. This goes
against the neoclassical theoretical grain, notwithstanding the fact that
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neoclassical theorists have become more sympathetic to market-based policies.
For this reason, this immensely important debate between planning and
market-based solutions remains neglected to this day. Although discussion of
the respective roles of the market and the public sector is commonplace, it is
typically presented in a mainstream framework. Hayek’s epistemic critique of
mainstream theory in the planning debate is rarely present in the teaching
curricula of university departments of economics. This omission partly accounts
for the surprisingly limited discussion within mainstream health economics of
the relative virtues of different types of health care system. If mainstream health
economists were to pay adequate attention to the problems of knowledge,
complexity, heterogeneity, and uncertainty that have to be addressed in such
comparative analyses, then they would have to abandon the more optimistic
informational assumptions at the core of neoclassical theory.
Note that the argument in this section does not depend on any particular
ideological inclination towards either markets or planning. Either way there
are problems, due to highly idiosyncratic and heterogeneous needs in the con-
text of uncertainty. Market-based systems increase contracting activity and
may exacerbate the problem of transaction costs. Planned systems face the pro-
blems of knowledge, complexity, and uncertainty. We are not faced with a sim-
ple dichotomy between market-based and planned systems. In fact, most
national health care systems involve a complex combination of administration
and competition, of public and private provision, and of centralized and decen-
tralized authority.
The evolution of health care needs and systems
Recent decades have seen massive ongoing changes in the nature and distribu-
tion of health care needs, and the capacities of health care technologies to
meet such needs. These have put new and changing demands on health care sys-
tems, although there is some disagreement in the literature regarding the impact
of aging on health care costs. It is widely accepted that a number of factors are
changing the scale and nature of health care needs. The first is growing longev-
ity and the increasing proportion of elderly in the populations of most
developed countries. This is augmenting the need for health care provision for
conditions associated with older age. An increase in the proportion of retired
people also creates problems for systems of health care funding that rely signif-
icantly on taxes or other contributions during periods of employment.
The second major factor is the increasing availability of new technologies for
screening, diagnostics, information analysis, and treatment, including expensive
new drugs and diagnostic equipment. Because of the costs involved, it is incon-
ceivable that all relevant available technologies will be employed in all cases.
The increase in the capacity to meet need comes at a cost, and the more this
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capacity is enhanced, the greater the potential cost involved. In response there is
likely to be an increasing ongoing emphasis on health technology assessment, to
determine the benefit of each technique. There is also likely to be the further
development of systems of prioritization or rationing. Without such measures,
there is the risk of huge cost overruns.
Significantly, new information technologies are giving patients access to new
information, leading to a growth in patient awareness and demands for greater
empowerment. These additional trends do not themselves increase health care
needs (which exist whether or not we are aware of them) but can greatly expand
health care demands, and put greater consumer pressure on the health care sys-
tem. People become more aware of the possibilities and come to expect solu-
tions. Not only are real health care possibilities enlarged, but people come to
believe that they need additional health care services. These heightened expecta-
tions have major systematic repercussions.
In this dynamic context, it becomes increasingly irrelevant to search for
optimal equilibria. Even if an optimum policy solution can be found, it will
not remain an optimum for long; relentless technological and demographic
changes will shift the optimum solution elsewhere. In any case, problems of un-
certainty make the identification of any optimum generally problematic; when
it is endlessly shifting then these problems are compounded. This real-world
dynamism undermines the relevance of neoclassical assumptions. Instead, there
is scope for other approaches to analysis, which abandon the focus on equilib-
rium and optimum solutions (Veblen, 1919; Schumpeter, 1934; Hayek, 1945;
Nelson, 1981; Nelson and Winter, 1982). In their place there is an assessment
of the processes of change themselves, with a view to understanding what
kind of efficacious interventions are possible in a complex, evolving system,
involving unforeseen outcomes.
The dynamic evaluation of health care needs
Economists often assume that they are dealing with consumers who know what
they want: consumer demands are sovereign. However, since Arrow’s (1963)
classic paper, even mainstream economists have widely doubted the applica-
bility of standard precepts of consumer demand and sovereignty to health
care systems. At least in health care, the consumer is not necessarily the best
judge of his or her welfare. Several mainstream economists have instead moved
towards a needs-based approach to health care evaluation, although the neo-
classical, utility-based theoretical approach remains supreme.
The familiar general objection to a needs-based approach is that it shifts the
decision of what is best for the individual to other individuals or institutions,
such as experts or the state. It is upheld that such a shift is illiberal and danger-
ous, because such alternative individuals or institutions have their own vested
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interests and are insufficiently familiar with individual preferences and
circumstances. But in proposing a needs-based approach it is not assumed
that needs are readily discernable. Doctors, for example, are often wrong in
their diagnoses. The central state is incapable of assessing many detailed needs
at the local level. The heterogeneous and idiosyncratic nature of health care
needs places further difficulties in the way of centralized assessments. Neither
is it proposed here that consumer preferences are irrelevant. Some middle
ground must be found between the propositions that the consumer always
knows best, and the state or the experts always know best: neither extreme
stance is convincing.
Abraham Maslow’s (1954) famous theory of needs is based essentially on
psychological considerations. More recent theories of need – particularly Doyal
and Gough (1991) – involve societal as well as psychological needs. Societal
needs are regarded as the social and institutional preconditions for the meeting
of individual needs such as survival and autonomy. Addressing both individual
and societal needs, neither individuals nor governments always know best. The
problem is to design institutions that set up a creative dialogue between indi-
vidual preferences and expert advice, embody mechanisms to scrutinize the
skills and claims of experts, and facilitate the creation and distribution of rele-
vant knowledge concerning health care.
It is important to emphasize that the incentives involved in the institutional
design of health care systems are never entirely pecuniary. Indeed, arguments
above concerning the nature of health care needs have proposed that they sus-
tain a professional ethos of care and obligation that is above and beyond any
pecuniary motive for health care workers. Health care institutions must nurture
and harness this ethos of obligation. While pecuniary incentives are also impor-
tant, they can be undermined by systems that overshadow override ethical and
other commitments by pecuniary incentives. Second, to cope with complexity
and change, systems require adequate internal diversity of institutional forms
and structural mechanisms. W. Ross Ashby’s (1956) ‘law of requisite variety’
is relevant here. Complexity and variety within the system are necessary so
that the system can survive and deal with complexity, variety, and unforesee-
able shocks in the real world. A coexisting variety of health care institutions
and subsystems provide a nationwide basis for comparative performance evalu-
ation and piecemeal experimentation. A close intellectual mentor for this type
of approach is John Dewey (1939). In the context of uncertainty and complex-
ity, Dewey favoured an experimental, process-oriented and participative demo-
cracy. Institutional design had to be cautious and experimental, looking at the
whole system as well as particular micro-interactions. He did not privilege
expert over other opinion but saw both as necessary parts of the policy process.
The primary role of experts is to outline feasible alternatives and their likely
consequences (Ryan, 1995; Evans, 2000). This aspect of his thinking is highly
relevant for health care systems.
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Conclusion
The predominant focus in the health economics literature has been on measure-
ment and quantification. Much effort has been put into establishing appropriate
measures for use in cost-effectiveness analyses, overlooking the inherent limita-
tions of such approaches. Health care systems are non-linear, complex, and
have strong interactive effects. Mainstream health care economists seem to
have set themselves the foremost and ultimate goal of providing full informa-
tion, in a field where problems of complexity and uncertainty are so extreme
that such a goal is not remotely achievable. The problems of uncertainty and
complexity will not disappear as a result even of titanic efforts of data collection
and measurement.
This prognosis is confirmed in practice. Citing studies of the impact of cost-
effectiveness research on health systems, Maria Goddard et al. (2006: 81)
observe that ‘despite the best endeavors of economists over many decades, it
is widely acknowledged that economic approaches to priority setting have had
only limited impact in practice’. Although there is much discussion of the
respective roles of market and state in health care in the mainstream literature,
it is often focused on micro instances to the neglect of systemic interactions in a
more dynamic and evolutionary context. The theoretical apparatus used to
make such evaluations is generally constrained by the protocols of standard
neoclassical theory.
It is been argued here that these protocols are severely challenged by the
realities of health care need and provision. While several mainstream health
economists have defied neoclassical welfare norms and embraced other indica-
tors, they have been remarkably deficient in utilizing other relevant concepts,
including the well-established and highly relevant idea of transaction costs.
The focus on the concept of need in the present paper reveals some special qual-
ities of health care, as summarized in Table 1 and compared with other needs.
Table 1 summarizes some important reasons why health care is special. As
argued above, and shown in the first column, with health care needs there is
relatively high involuntariness and distributive inequality. Most health care
needs emerge beyond individual control and there is a large variation in the
degree of health care need between individuals. In practice, this observation
enhances the intrinsic motivation and commitment of service providers. By con-
trast, there is much less inequality in the distribution of educational and nutri-
tional needs.
Turning to the second column, a high degree of variety and idiosyncrasy gene-
rates transaction cost problems for a market system and incentive specification
problems for a centrally planned system. It may be that planned health systems
such as the British NHS have previously been able to mitigate incentive speci-
fication problems by maintaining a strong ethic of professional commitment.
If true, this has relatively unexplored implications for health policy and the
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design of health care systems. It would mean that more central planning and
less market provision are viable than in other sectors, as long as an ethic of pro-
fessional dedication and commitment is nurtured.
In the third column, the picture is further complicated by the rate of growth
in health care needs due to an ageing population and increasing technological
capabilities. Although arguments concerning dynamic systems often point to
the virtues of market competition, even here Richard Nelson (1981) argues
that theory and evidence both suggest a combination of market and state
supply.
Overall, this framework of needs analysis offers a research agenda for the
comparison of different systems of provision. It combines with strong argu-
ments in mainstream health economics against a fragmented and competitive
system of health insurance, in favour of state or other monopsonistic provision
on a universal basis (Arrow, 1963; Rice, 2001). Although there is a relatively
superficial empirical literature in this area, in mainstream health economics
there is inadequate comparative discussion of health care systems, informed
by a theoretical perspective that takes sufficient account of institutional struc-
tures.2 Issues of structural and overall institutional design are given insufficient
attention by health economists. Instead, they emerge in health policy and other
areas.
But such comparative system studies seem to provide the most promising
route towards an understanding of the merits and demerits of private, public,
and mixed provision in this area. We need to explore alternative approaches
that have a stronger record in comparative institutional analysis, take into
account more than static efficiency comparisons, and deal with other important
matters such as learning and technological innovation. The alternative tradi-
tions in economics that prioritize these issues are sometimes described as ‘insti-
tutional’ or ‘evolutionary’ by their adherents. There are numerous academic
articles and book publications in this area. Journals such as the Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Issues, Journal of
Evolutionary Economics, and Journal of Institutional Economics all publish
Table 1. Comparative dimensions of educational, nutritional and health care needs
Degrees of involuntariness
and inequality in distribution
Degrees of variety
and idiosyncrasy
Rate of growth of the
needs that can be met
Health care needs High High High
Educational needs Low Medium Medium
Nutritional needs Low Low Low
2 Dixon and Mossialos (2002) and McPake et al. (2002) are examples of comparative analyses of
health care systems.
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material on institutional and evolutionary themes. Dialogue between these
alternative currents and those working of health care policies and health care
system design, promises to be fruitful and rewarding.
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